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NOTES AND COMMENTS

621

III. Acts Confirming Property to Married Women.4
Be it enacted that A. B. of Wilkes County, wife of C. D., be,
and she is hereby entitled to hold, possess and enjoy, in her sole
right, any estate, either real or personal, which she [now has or]
may hereafter acquire, by her own industry, purchase, gift or otherwise, in as full and ample a manner as if she had never been married
to her said husband; and she is hereby authorized to prosecute or
defend any suit in her own name, in any court within this State,
in the same manner as if she had never been married.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Hospital Records
In Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.' the defendant sought
to introduce in evidence its insured's hospital record in an attempt
to show that she had made certain misrepresentations about her
health when applying for a life insurance policy. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that although records of this type are hearsay, they are generally admissible, being within the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. However, admission of the particular record involved was denied on the grounds that it contained
privileged communications between physician and patient.'
At common law, business records offered to prove the facts recorded therein were admissible upon a showing that the records
were made in the regular course of business, with the personal
knowledge of the entrant, at or near the time of the transaction
' See, e.g, N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 71. The bracketed words in this
form were not always present. The first of these acts was passed in 1794.
It recited that the husband had deserted the wife and was living in adultery.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 101. The number of women named in the acts
varied from one to twenty-two. In at least one a man was included. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1808, ch. 115.
1257

N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).

GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953), provides "no person, duly authorized
to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any information
2 N.C.

which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for

such patient as a physician or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided,
that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure,
if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice."
The court in the instant case held that this privilege extends to hospital records which contain entries made by physicians, or under their direction,
pertaining to information obtained while treating the patient in a professional
capacity. 257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331 (1962).
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recorded, and that the entrant was dead or otherwise not available
as a witness.3
Hospital records have been admitted in evidence under the same
conditions as business records,4 but the common law requirement
that each person making an entry in the record must be present as
a witness or have his non-availability accounted for, has often resulted in the record's exclusion.5 With the advent of modern hospital practices, where any number of physicians, nurses, and interns
are involved in caring for a patient, the entrants, if identifiable at
all are likely to be so numerous as to make their presence in court
impractical. Even if each entrant were called to testify, he could
hardly be expected to recall the facts upon which any one entry was
based, and in the end, he himself would have to rely on the record.'

Therefore, it seems that the presence of the entrant could add little
or nothing to what the record itself contains.7 The absence of the
entrant should not impugn the reliability of the record, for the
systematic recording of hospital records, the lack of motive for
their falsification, and the fact that a patient's life may depend upon
their accuracy are adequate assurances of their trustworthiness. 8
A few courts, recognizing the reliability of hospital records, and
the impracticality of calling each entrant, have allowed undue inconvenience to be an adequate reason for the entrant's absence, provided that someone familiar with the records verifies them and
testifies that they were made in the regular course of business.'
'Ward v. Music, 257 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1953); Missouri Forged Tool
Co. v. St. Louis Car Co., 205 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. 1947) (record excluded because entrant not shown to have been unavailable); Lebrun v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 83 N.H. 293, 142 Atl. 128 (1928); Jameson v. First
Say. Bank & Trust Co., 40 N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743 (1936); Mercer v. Denne
[1905] 2 Ch. 538; Smith v. Blakey, L.R. 2 Q.B. 326 (1867).
"E.g., Grossman v. Delaware Elec. Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155 Atl. 806
(1929); Gearhart v. Des Moines Ry., 237 Iowa 213, 21 N.W.2d 569 (1946);
Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301 (1930); Conlon v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 88, 183 Atl. 850 (1936); Hill v.
National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 11 Tenn. App. 33 (1929).
'E.g., Branch v. Woulfe, 300 I1. App. 472, 21 N.E.2d 148 (1939) (record excluded because only one of two nurses produced) ; Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 (1938).

'6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1707 (3d ed. 1940).
" See MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 290 (1954); Hale, Hospital Records as
Evidence, 14 So. CAL. L. Rv. 99 (1941).

' Globe Indem. Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 Atl. 43 (1927) ; see 6

WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1707; MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 7,

§ 290.
'E.g., United States v. Wescoat, 49 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1931); Whittaker v. Thornberry, 306 Ky. 830, 209 S.W.2d 498 (1948) ; Lund v. Olson,
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However, the reluctance of most courts ° to dispense with the requirement of calling each entrant has led a number of states to adopt
legislation to remedy the situation, either in the form of the Model
Act" or the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. 12

Such

acts are intended to broaden the scope of admissibility of business
records.' 3 Both the Model Act and the Uniform Act contain broad
definitions of "business," 14 thereby allowing for the admissibility
of hospital records.' 5 Also both acts eliminate the necessity of producing the numerous persons who may have had a part in the creation of the record.' 6
Although hospital records are generally admissible to prove
clinical facts,' 7 a problem is presented when a record entry is based
upon a statement by the patient as to the cause of the accident which
resulted in his injury.'" It has been held'" that such information,
182 Minn. 204, 234 N.W. 310 (1931); St. Louis v. Boston & Me. R.R., 83
N.H. 538, 145 Ad. 263 (1929) (record prepared by 31 nurses would have

been admissible had it been verified by the record clerk).
"'E.g.,National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Threlkeld, 189 Ark. 165, 70
S.W.2d 851 (1934) (identification of record by hospital custodian held to
be insufficient); Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331, 85
P.2d 819 (1938).
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (1958); N.Y. Civ. PRuc. AcT § 374
(1962); see also Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1959), as
amended, 75 Stat. 413, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (Supp. 1961), which was based
upon the Model Act.
'E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 600.01-.04 (1945); OHIo REv. CODE §
2317.40 (Supp. 1962).
" Frampton v. Hartzell, 179 Cal. App. 2d 771, 4 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1960);
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50 A.2d
256 (1946).
"The Model Act provides that "the term 'business' shall include every
business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind." The Uniform
Act contains an even broader definition by adding "whether carried on for
profit or not." Compare TEX. RE V. STAT. art. 3737e (Supp. 1962), which
incorporated the most important sections of both the Model Act and the
Uniform Act.
" Case v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W.2d 670 (1954) (construing
a statute based upon the Model Act); Roeder v. North Am. Life Ins. Co.,
259 Minn. 168, 106 N.W.2d 624 (1960) (construing the Uniform Act).
"'United States v. Olivo, 278 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955).
' See McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 7, § 290.
The objection to a patient's statement as to how the accident occurred
is not whether the statement was actually made, but whether it was in fact

true.
" Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E.2d 879 (1958), where the plaintiff, an inmate in a state mental hospital, sought to introduce in evidence a
record entry relating to the cause of an accident which was based upon a
statement by another inmate. The entry was excluded because the inmate
was under no business duty to relate such information. Williams v." Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
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when imparted by persons not acting pursuant to a business duty,
should be excluded as multiple hearsay.2" The reason advanced for
this holding is that there is no guarantee as to the truth of voluntary hearsay statements made by third persons not acting in the
regular course of business.2 Other courts have held that when the
record states the patient's version of how the accident occurred, its
admissibility is dependent upon whether the entry was made within
the scope of hospital business. 22 Since the business of a hospital is
to diagnose and treat the ailments of its patients, any entries containing statements not germane thereto are not made in the regular
course of business.23 Therefore, any self-serving statements relating to the cause of a patient's accident are inadmissible,2 4 except to
the extent that they are of aid in diagnosis or treatment. 25
Record entries containing a physician's diagnosis of a patient
based upon observations and objective data are generally admissible
in evidence. 2' However, when the record contains a diagnosis in
" When record entries are based upon statements made by third persons,
the facts contained therein are neither within the personal knowledge of the
entrant nor of the witness verifying the record; therefore such entries
amount
to hearsay on hearsay.
21
Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), where a policeman's report was excluded because it was based upon information imparted
by a bystander. This case was severely criticized in 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 1530(a) (3d ed. 1940).
2 E.g., Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224
(1938); Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954).
"Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 168 A.2d 501 (1961), where
the court held that in order to be admissible, "statements in a hospital record
must be pathologically germane to the physical condition which caused the
patient to go to the hospital." In Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 385, 41
A.2d 688 (1945), where a Negro man was being tried for murder, a hospital
record contained a statement by the deceased victim that he was shot by a
white man. The court excluded the record saying, "It was really none of
the physician's professional 'business' who shot the patient" and that neither
the inquiry nor the answer was in the regular course of hospital business.
2, Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A.2d 117 (1949); Gilligan
v. International Paper Co., 24 N.J. 230, 131 A.2d 503 (1957); In Green v.
City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63 (1948), a record entry
stating that the patient fell off a street car and caught her heel was excluded
because the statement had no relation to medical treatment.
" See Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A.2d 689 (1948),
where the court held that the plaintiff's recorded statement that he twisted
his ankle while walking along a sidewalk was pathologically germane to the
injury, as it aided the physician in diagnosis. The court also noted that the
statement was an admission by the plaintiff. Lee v. Housing Authority, 203
Md. 453, 101 A.2d 832 (1954), where an entry stating that the patient came
to the hospital "after being burned when a gas stove exploded near her"
was held to be a proper entry relating to the nature and cause of the injury
which would aid the physician in treatment.
"'Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Tawney, 233 F.2d 353
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the form of an opinion, its admissibility is somewhat more dubious,
for the opposing party is left without the opportunity of crossexamination on matters of a technical and perhaps conjectural
nature. Accordingly, in a number of cases the record has been
excluded where it contained diagnostic opinions as to the patient's
This result has been based on the
condition or cause of illness."
assumption that medical opinions, formulated from symptoms which
are difficult of interpretation, lose the guaranty of trustworthiness
A
which is required for the admissibility of hospital records.2
majority of the courts, however, have rejected this line of reasoning
and will allow a doctor's opinion to be shown by the record as long
as it meets the general tests of reliability.2 9 A further hindrance
to the presentation of opinion evidence is the qualification of the
physician as an expert without his appearing in court. It has been
suggested that this may be done by showing that the physician has
30
been duly licensed or is employed by a reputable hospital.
North Carolina has no statute governing the admissibility of
business records as evidence, 3 ' but has resolved the problem on common law principles. 2 The early cases involving the competency of
regularly kept business records held that they could be received in
evidence only if the entrant were dead.3 3 Since that time, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has adopted a more realistic rule, taking
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (record stated that glass fragments were discovered during
a rectal examination of the patient); D'Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54,
97 A2d 893 (1953) (it was doctor's opinion that the patient was intoxicated).
" Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 961 (1958) (psychiatric diagnosis was excluded); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Knudsen v. DuffeeFreeman, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 872, 99 S.E.2d 370 (1957); Young v. Li ddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957); Keller v. Wonn, 140 W. Va.
860, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
'2 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, supra note 27 at 304.
" E.g, Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Buckminister's
Estate v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944); Allen v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1956); People v. Kohlmeyer, 284
N.Y. 366, 31 N.E.2d 490 (1940); McReynolds v. Howland, 218 Ore. 566,
346 P.2d 127 (1959).
" See Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 29; Hale, supra note
7, at 108. See also Thomas v. Hogan, supra note 29.
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-42 (1953), enacted in 1756, provides for the
admission of book accounts under sixty dollars, but this statute is very limited and covers nothing that would not otherwise be admissible under the
business records rule today.
" See text accompanying note 3 supra.
"Ray v. Castle, 79 N.C. 580 (1878); Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N.C. 29
(1876); Bland v. Warren, 65 N.C. 372 (1871).
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into account modern business conditions under which it would be
impossible to attempt to produce every person involved in recording
a particular transaction. Accordingly, the court under this more
modern rule will admit business records in evidence if they are
made in the regular course of business, contemporaneous with the
transaction involved, and if they are authenticated by a witness who
is familiar with such records and the manner in which they are
made.3 4
The Sims"5 case has removed any doubt as to the possibility of
entering hospital records into evidence under North Carolina's liberal business records rule. The court held that although hospital
records are hearsay when offered as primary evidence, they nevertheless may be admitted as business records once the proper foundation has been laid.30 In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that hospital records are probably more accurate than the
independent recollection of the persons making them and that a
motive for their falsification is lacking. Possibly the court's confidence in the reliability of regularly kept hospital records will lead
to the admission of expert medical opinion incorporated in the
record. This supposition is substantiated by the fact that the record
in the principal case contained a number of diagnostic opinions which
would have been admissible except for the physician-patient privi7
3

lege.

Notwithstanding the reliability of hospital records, the court
pointed out that any entries which are irrelevant or which amount
to hearsay on hearsay should be excluded from jury consideration.,
Although there was no limitation placed upon what was to be excluded as hearsay on hearsay, this should not be construed to include
all record entries merely because they were not made upon the entrant's personal knowledge. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has consistently held, with regard to business records, that an entrant's personal knowledge of a transaction recorded is unnecessary
"' Smith Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Dixon, 246 N.C. 136, 97 S.E.2d 767
(1957); Dairy & Ice Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 232
N.C. 684, 61 S.E.2d 895 (1950) ; State v. Lippard, 223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E.2d
594 (1943); Breneman Co. v. Cunningham, 207 N.C. 77, 175 S.E. 829
(1934); Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Hegwood, 198 N.C. 309, 151 S.E. 641
(1930); Flowers v. Spears, 190 N.C. 747, 130 S.E. 710 (1925); Firemen's
Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452 (1905).
"257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
"Id. at 35, 125 S.E.2d at 329.
'*Id.
at 39, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
"Id. at 35, 125 S.E.2d at 329.
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so long as both the entrant and his informer are acting under a
business duty. 9 The court's prohibition of multiple hearsay was
statements made by a
obviously meant to exclude any extra-judicial
40
patient referring to the cause of his injury.
In view of the court's liberal opinion in the Sims case, it would
seem that in the future the only obstacle preventing more frequent
use of hospital records as evidence will be the physician-patient
privilege. But, now that it is clear that such records may be admitted, perhaps the trial judge will closely examine them and not
hesitate to exercise the discretion granted him to disclose the privileged communication "if in his opinion it is necessary to a proper
administration of justice."'"
S. EPES ROBINSON
Evidence-Physician-Patient Privilege-Compelling Disclosure of
Privileged Information-Discretion of the Trial Judge
While at common law no privilege was recognized for communications between patient and physician,' North Carolina and over
thirty other states3 have by statute created such a privilege. The
"E.g., Breneman Co. v. Cunningham, 207 N.C. 77, 175 S.E. 829 (1934) ;
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452
(1905), where record entries made by a train dispatcher based upon information obtained from a station agent 100 miles away were admissible to
show the position of a train at a given time.
,0 See note 20 supra.
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953), in addition to establishing the physician-patient privilege, provides that the trial judge may order the disclosure
of such privileged communications in order to facilitate a proper administration of justice. This provision in the statute was enacted to provide against
an injustice resulting from the suppression of evidence by the patient's
claim of privilege. In Sins, the Supreme Court, recognizing the legislature's
intended purpose in making this provision, cast considerable doubt upon the
soundness of the trial judge's decision not to compel disclosure of the record.
' "If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he
would be guilty of a breach of honor and of great indiscretion; but to give
that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is
bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever."
The Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Trials 573 (1776). See also
Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960); State v. Martin, 182
N.C. 846, 849, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921) ; STANSBURY, EvIDENCE § 63 (1946).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
North Carolina enacted its privilege
statute in 1885 and it has remained in its original form, without amendment, to date. A similar statutory privilege is also provided for communications between clergymen and communicants. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1
(Supp. 1961).
' New York in 1828 became the first state to depart from the commonlaw rule and provide for the privilege. Since then over two-thirds of the
states have enacted similar legislation. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380
n.5 (McNaughton rev. 1961) where these statutes are compiled and quoted.

